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UNPRINCIPLED EXCLUSIONS: THE STRUGGLE TO
ACHIEVE JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE EQUALITY FOR
TRANSGENDER PEOPLE
PAISLEY CURRAH AND SHANNON MINTER*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines recent efforts to enact civil rights
statutes for transgender people in the United States. Part I
provides an overview of the largely negative case law on the issue
of whether transgender people are protected under existing sex,
sexual orientation or disability discrimination laws. This context
is provided, in part, to explain why transgender rights advocates
have turned to the legislative branches of government to secure
basic civil rights protections. Part II describes the initial
successes that have been achieved as a result of this new focus on
political activism and legislation. Part III examines the actual
statutory language that has been used to protect transgender
people, as well as some of the key strategic questions that have
arisen in the course of drafting such legislation.
I. UNPRINCIPLED EXCLUSIONS: THE SHORT UNHAPPY LIFE OF
TRANSGENDER JURISPRUDENCE
Transgender' people face severe discrimination in virtually
every aspect of social life--in employment, housing, public
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i. This Article uses the term transgender in its most inclusive sense, as an umbrella
term encompassing: pre-operative, post-operative and non-operative transsexual people;
cross-dressers; feminine men and masculine women; intersexed persons; and more
generally, anyone whose gender identity or expression differs from conventional
expectations of masculinity or femininity. In contrast, some legal scholars have used the
term more narrowly, as a synonym for transsexual. See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual
Orientation, Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 238 n.1
(1996) (defining transgender people as those "who desire to change their gender, are in
the process of changing their gender, or have completed the process of changing their
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accommodations, credit, marriage, parenting and law enforce-
ment, among others.2 This discrimination is rooted in the same
stereotypes that have fueled unequal treatment of women,
lesbian, gay, bisexual people and people with disabilities-i.e.,
stereotypes about how men and women are "supposed" to behave
and about how male and female bodies are "supposed" to appear.3
For the most part, in other words, anti-transgender discrimina-
tion is not a new or unique form of bias, but rather falls squarely
within the parameters of discrimination based on sex, sexual
orientation and/or disability.' From a strictly philosophical or
doctrinal perspective, therefore, it might well seem that the most
logical course would be to seek protection for transgender people
through litigation under statutes that already prohibit
gender"). For a helpful discussion of the evolving historical meanings of the term
transgender, see Jamison Green, Introduction to PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER,
POLICY INST. OF THE NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE & NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN
RIGHTS, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS 1, 3-5
(2000), available at http:/ www.ngltf.org/library/index.cfin.
2. PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, POLICY INST. OF THE NATL GAY & LESBIAN
TASK FORCE & NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A HANDBOOK
FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS 9-12 (2000), available at
http://www.ngltf.org/library/index.cfm (describing discrimination against tranagender
people in social services, education, employment, housing, public accommodations,
marriage, parenting, immigration, health care, hate violence and other areas).
3. Id. at 8-9 (explaining that both anti-gay and anti-transgender discrimination are
rooted in sexism and gender stereotyping). For an early analysis of how transgender
people unsettle stereotypical assumptions about male and female anatomy and behavior,
see generally HARRY BENJAMIN, THE TRANSSEXUAL PHENOMENON (1966).
4. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Stories from the Gender Garden: Transsexuals and
Anti-Discrimination Law, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1321, 1355-59 (1998) (arguing that
transgender people should be protected under sex discrimination laws); Mary Coombs,
Sexual Dis-Orientation: Transgendered People and Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S
L.J. 219, 257-65 (1998) (arguing that gay and transgender people experience the same
type of discrimination with regard to marriage); Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and
Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265,
324-28 (1999) (arguing that transgender people should be protected under sex
discrimination laws); Susan Etta Keller, Operations of Legal Rhetoric: Examining
Transsexual and Judicial Identity, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 375-79 (1999)
(arguing that gay and transgender people are inextricably linked and experience the
same types of discrimination); Adrienne L. Hiegel, Note, Sexual Exclusions: The
Americans with Disabilities Act as a Moral Code, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1451, 1479 (1994)
(arguing that transsexual people should be protected under disability laws); Kristine W.
Holt, Comment, Reevaluating Holloway: Title VII, Equal Protection, and the Evolution of
a Trangender Jurisprudence, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 283, 315-18 (1997) (arguing that
transgender people should be protected under sex discrimination laws).
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discrimination on those bases, rather than attempting,
legislatively, to create a new set of statutory protections. 5 -
In practice, however, litigation alone has proved to be a
singularly unsuccessful route to winning basic civil rights
protections for transgender people. With few exceptions, courts
presented with sex or other discrimination claims on behalf of
transgender people have dismissed those claims out of hand, with
very little in the way of rational analysis or application of the
law.6 As a result, although there is now what Judge Richard
Posner has called a "nascent jurisprudence of transsexualism," 7 it
consists largely of decisions in which courts, including Posner's
own,8 have summarily excluded transgender people from civil
protections that are readily available to non-transgender
persons.9
Legal scholars have put forward a variety of theoretical
explanations for why courts have failed to deal with transgender
people in a coherent or principled way.10 Ultimately, however, it
is probably not possible to identify any single doctrinal error or
logical mistake that will account for-and thus provide a simple
means of remedying-the historical exclusion of transgender
people from equal protection in the courts. For the most part,
transgender people have not been excluded from civil rights
protections because of conceptual or philosophical failures in
5. Katherine Franke, for example, has recently suggested that transgender
advocates should not seek "to add transgender people or transgenderism ... into the
laundry list of identity groups or statutes that are protected by human rights laws, but
[should seek] instead to robustly interpret what our sex- and gender-based discrimination
laws prohibit." Katherine Franke, Current Issues in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgendered Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 279, 381 (1999).
6. For a survey of cases involving transgender people, see Shannon Minter,
Representing Transsexual Clients: An Overview of Selected Legal Issues, at
http://www.transgenderlaw.org (Sept. 2000). For two helpful recent discussions of this
case law, see Greenberg, supra note 4, at 292-325; Richard F. Storrow, Naming the
Grotesque Body in the 'Nascent Jurisprudence of Transsexualism," 4 MICH. J. GENDER &
L. 275, 285-332 (1997).
7. Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 320 (7th Cir. 1993).
8. See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding
that transsexual people are not protected under Title VII).
9. See Greenberg, supra note 4, at 292 (concluding that transgender people have
been denied equal protection of the law); Storrow, supra note 6, at 332-34 (same); Holt,
supra note 4, at 306 (same).
10. E.g., Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1
(1995); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995); Francisco Valdes, Queers,
Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," 'Gender," and
'Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 3 (1995).
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legal reasoning, but rather because they have not been viewed as
worthy of protection or,in some cases, even as human.1
In the employment arena, this differential treatment has
operated to exclude transsexual plaintiffs from any ability even
to state a viable discrimination claim. As Professor Richard
Storrow has rightly pointed out:
Employment discrimination jurisprudence at both the federal
and state levels ... captures transsexuals in a discourse of
exclusion from social participation. This wide net, using a
remarkably refined system of semantic manipulations, snags
all claims launched by transsexuals and reveals that no
matter how a transsexual frames her discrimination claim, it
will fail. 12
The impact of these judicial exclusions has been particularly
stark in sex discrimination cases. Thus, although it is difficult to
see how an employer's decision to terminate an employee for
undergoing sex-reassignment could plausibly be deemed
anything other than a form of sex-based discrimination, courts
have adopted the Orwellian notion that there is a meaningful
legal distinction between discrimination because of sex and
discrimination because of a change of sex. 13 In Holloway v.
Arthur Anderson & Co., for example, Ramona Holloway was
11. In one case, for example, a court compared a male-to-female transsexual to a
donkey. See Ashlie v. Chester-Upland Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A.78-4037, 1979 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12516, at *14 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 1979); Keller, supra note 4, at 374 (describing
Ashlie as a "stunning confirmation" of a more widespread judicial "tendency to view the
transsexual as becoming less than human through transformation); see also Storrow,
supra note 6, at 334 (arguing that transsexual people have been "systematically denied
basic rights" because they trigger a "deeply rooted aversion . . .[which] seems almost
insurmountable").
12. Storrow, supra note 6, at 310.
13. The European Court of Justice criticized this purported distinction in Case C-
13/94, P. v. S. & Cornwall County Council, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2159, 2165 [1996] 2 C.M.L.R.
247, 263 (1996) (holding that discrimination against a transsexual person "is based,
essentially if not exclusively, on the sex of the person concerned"); see also Maffei v.
Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding that city
ordinance prohibiting gender discrimination protects transsexual people); Rentos v. OCE-
Office Sys., 95 Civ. 7908, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19060, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1996)
(holding that state law prohibiting sex discrimination should be interpreted to include
transsexual people). In addition, on November 9, 2000, the Connecticut Human Rights
Commission issued a declaratory ruling holding that transgender people are protected
under the Connecticut law prohibiting sex discrimination. See Declaratory Ruling on
Behalf of John/Jane Doe, (Conn. Comm'n Human Rights & Opportunities Nov. 9, 2000) at
http://www.state.ct.us/chro/metapages/ HearingOffice/HODecisions/declaratoryrulings/DR
Doe.htm [hereinafter Declaratory Ruling].
14. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
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fired for transitioning from male to female on the job. i5 The
Ninth Circuit held that Holloway was not discriminated against
"because she is male or female, but rather because she is a
transsexual who chose to change her sex. This type of claim is not
actionable under Title VII."16 Similarly, in Underwood v. Archer
Management Services, Inc.,17 the plaintiff alleged that she had
been terminated from her job because, as a transsexual woman,
she retained some masculine traits.18 The court held that insofar
as "she was discriminated against because ... she transformed
herself into a woman" rather than "because she is a woman," she
had failed to state a viable sex discrimination claim.19
The incoherence of this purportedly meaningful distinction
(between sex and change of sex) is apparent the moment one
imagines a court applying a similar distinction in a case
involving discrimination on any other ground. It is unlikely, for
example, that an employer who terminated an employee for
changing her religious affiliation or nationality would be absolved
of liability on the ground that he did not object to the employee's
new religion or national origin, but only to the change of religion
or national origin.20 Yet, the only difference between these
situations and that of a transsexual person is that while
changing one's religion or nationality is generally considered to
be a legitimate personal choice, "the very idea that one sex can
change into another" is likely to engender "ridicule and horror."2
Perhaps because of the extreme discomfort that transgender
people often evoke, courts have also relied on the dehumanizing
argument that transsexual people cannot be classified as either
male or female and, therefore, do not fall into a protected
15. Id. at 661.
16. Id. at 664; see also Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984)
(holding that Title VII does not protect "a person born with a male body who believes
herself to be a female"); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982)
(same); James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 478, 481 (D. Kan. 1995)
(same); Terry v. EEOC, No. 80-C-408, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17289, at **7-8 (E.D. Wis.
Dec. 10, 1980) (same); Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 371 (D. Md. 1977) (same);
Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr., 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (same).
17. 857 F. Supp. 96 (D.D.C. 1994).
18. Id. at 98.
19. Id.; see also Dobre v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. (AMTRAK), 850 F. Supp. 284,
288 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that a transsexual woman could not state a viable sex
discrimination claim under the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act).
.20. See Holt, supra note 4, at 306 (noting that transgender people have been excluded
from Title VII and other sex discrimination laws "based on reasoning that would be
rejected if courts applied it to any other group").
21. Storrow, supra note 6, at 334; see also Ronald R. Garet, Self-Transformability, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 159-64 (1991) (analyzing the similarities between religious
conversion and sex reassignment).
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category under sex discrimination laws. In Ulane v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc. ,22 for example, the Seventh Circuit held that Karen
Ulane, a transsexual woman fired from her job as an airline pilot
because she changed her sex, had failed to state a viable claim of
sex discrimination under Title VII.23  In dismissing Ulane's
claim, the court was openly derisive of her identification as a
woman, which the court characterized as pathetic and delusional:
Ulane is entitled to any personal belief about her sexual
identity she desires. After the surgery, hormones, appearance
changes, and a new Illinois birth certificate and FAA pilot's
certificate, it may be that society ... considers Ulane to be
female. But even if one believes that a woman can be so easily
created from what remains of a man, that does not decide this
case.... [Ilf Eastern did discriminate against Ulane, it was
not because she is female, but because Ulane is a
transsexual-a biological male who takes female hormones,
cross-dresses, and has surgically altered parts of her body to
make it appear to be female.24
As Professor Susan Keller has noted, the Court's description
of Karen Ulane not only excludes her from any definitive
identification as either female or male, but in so doing, effectively
excludes her from the category of human as well. 25
[The] court suggests that it may not be so easy to create a
woman "from what remains of a man," it also suggests that
the transsexual litigant is something less than either a man
or a woman, and-since it has previously offered those as the
only choices-something less than human.26
22. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
23. Id. at 1087.
24. Id. In contrast, the trial court in Ulane had concluded that:
[Slex is not a cut-and-dried matter of chromosomes, and . . . that the
term, "sex," as used in any scientific sense and as used in the statute can
be and should be reasonably interpreted to include among its denotations
the question of sexual identity and that, therefore, transsexuals are
protected by Title VII.
Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 825 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
25. Keller, supra note 4, at 338.
26. Id. at 373; see also, e.g., Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th
Cir. 1982) (concluding that "even medical experts disagree as to whether [the plaintiffl is
properly classified as male or female"); Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337
N.W.2d 470, 474 (Iowa 1983) (holding that state sex discrimination law protects men and
women but not "persons with attributes of both sexes").
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Transgender people who have sought protection under the
rubric of gay rights statutes have been placed in a similar double
bind. In jurisdictions that do not prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation, courts have emphasized the similarity
of gay and transgender people, relying upon decisions that have
excluded lesbians and gay men from protection under Title VII as
a rationale for excluding transsexual people.27 At the same time,
courts in jurisdictions that protect lesbians and gay men have
concluded that transsexualism is distinct from sexual orientation
and have dismissed sexual orientation claims by transsexual
plaintiffs on that basis.28 The result, as Richard Storrow has
pointed out, is that "no matter the wording of the statutory
regime, transsexuals generally are not protected from
employment discrimination on either the basis of their
transsexualism or their sexual orientation."29
Transsexual employees have also been largely unsuccessful
in achieving protection under state disability rights statutes.
30
In Doe v. Boeing Co.,31 for example, the plaintiff (a male-to-
female transsexual) was discharged after she wore a string of
pearls to work in violation of Boeing's unwritten dress policy,
which allowed Doe (and all other "male" employees) to wear male
or unisex clothing but prohibited her from wearing female
clothing until she had undergone sex reassignment surgery.
3 2
27. See, e.g., Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084-86 (citing failed attempts to enact a federal law
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as a reason to exclude
transsexual people from Title VII); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662
(9th Cir. 1977) (same); Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 370 (D. Md. 1977) (holding
that Title VII does not include transsexuals, homosexuals or bisexuals); Voyles v. Ralph
K Davies Med. Ctr., 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (same).
28. See, e.g., Underwood v. Archer Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D.D.C.
1994) (holding that transsexual people are not included within the definition of sexual
orientation in the District of Columbia Human Rights Act). The one exception is
Minnesota, where the legislature has expressly defined sexual orientation to include
transgender people. See discussion infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
29. Storrow, supra note 6, at 314; see generally Valdes, supra note 10 (documenting
how courts have created arbitrary loopholes in anti-discrimination law by conflating
sexual orientation and gender identity in some cases and denying any connection between
the two in others).
30. Transgender persons are expressly excluded from protection under federal laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 706(8XFXi) (1994); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1)
(1994). Some state disability statutes explicitly exclude transgender people as well. See
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-5-6(dX3) (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 15.102(5Xb)(1)(b) (West
1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2232(11)(b) (West Supp. 2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-
1102(9) (1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(AX16)(bXii) (West Supp. 2000); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1451(6) (West 2000); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 301.003(6) (Vernon
1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 36-96.1:1 (Michie 1996).
31. 846 P.2d 531 (Wash. 1993).
32. Id. at 533.
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The Washington Supreme Court acknowledged that gender
dysphoria is a "medically cognizable condition with a prescribed
course of treatment,"33 including living as a member of the other
gender before obtaining sex-reassignment surgery. Yet, despite
having recognized that Doe's feminine appearance was directly
linked to her gender dysphoria, the court held that "Boeing
discharged Doe because she violated Boeing's directives on
acceptable attire, not because she was gender dysphoric."34
Following the decision in Doe, a number of other state courts
have also interpreted their state disability laws to exclude
transgender plaintiffs.35
In short, one does not have to look past the case law to find
at least one powerful reason why transgender people have been
motivated to lobby for specific civil rights protections. Because
courts have routinely created a "transgender exception" to
existing non-discrimination laws, transgender advocates have
concluded that one obvious solution is to create legislation that is
designed to remedy these exclusions by specifically designating
transgender people as a protected group. Thus, it is at least in
part because of the animosity transgender people have
encountered in the courts that they have turned to the legislative
branches of government-local city councils, state legislatures
and Congress 3O---to secure basic civil rights protections.
33. Id. at 536.
34. Id. In contrast, the Washington Court of Appeals had concluded that Doe's
alleged violation of the dress code could not be separated from her medical condition:
"Boeing failed to reasonably accommodate the medical requirement that Doe dress in
feminine attire prior to undergoing the prescribed surgery." Doe v. Boeing Co., 823 P.2d
1159, 1164 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); see also Kristin R. Rowland, Note, Amorphous
Employment Discrimination Protection for Transsexuals: Doe v. Boeing, 4 TEMP. POL. &
CIv. RTS. L. REV. 361, 377 (1995) ("Doe's violation of the company's dress code policy was
clearly related to her transsexualism .... ").
35. See Holt v. Northwest Pa. Training P'ship Consortium, Inc., 694 A.2d 1134, 1139
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (holding that transsexualism is not a protected disability under
the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act); Dobre v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. (AMTRAK),
850 F. Supp. 284, 288-90 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (same); Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n,
337 N.W.2d 470, 474-77 (Iowa 1983) (holding that transsexualism is not a protected
disability under the Iowa Civil Rights Act).
36. Although most legislative advocacy on behalf of tranegender people is focused at
the local and state level, some transgender advocates have lobbied for the inclusion of
transgender people in the federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA). ENDA
would prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See Holt,
supra note 4, at 313. In addition, transgender advocates and allies have also lobbied to
include transgender people in the proposed federal Hate Crimes Prevention Act. See, e.g.,
Book Note, Kara S. Suffredini, Which Bodies Count When They Are Bashed?: An
Argument for the Inclusion of Transgendered Individuals in the Hate Crimes Prevention
Act of 1999, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 447, 463-65 (2000) (reviewing DANGEROUS
LIASONS: BLACKS, GAYS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (Eric Brandt. ed 1999))
(expressing concern that the phrase "actual or perceived gender" in the 1999 version of
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II. LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLES AND SUCCESSES
In the past ten years, transgender people have made
unprecedented efforts to lobby for civil rights laws.37 To date,
these efforts have been most successful at the local level. In
1975, Minneapolis, Minnesota passed the first local ordinance
prohibiting discrimination against transgender people." Fifteen
years later, only a handful of additional cities had followed suit-
Champaign and Urbana, Illinois, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Los
Angeles, California, Seattle, Washington and St. Paul,
Minnesota. 39 By the end of 2000, however, the number of local
ordinances protecting transgender people had multiplied. There
are now thirty-one such local laws in place.40 Transgender-
protective ordinances in DeKalb, Illinois and Portland, Oregon 41
are the two most recent additions.
the act may not be sufficiently explicit to ensure that courts will interpret the law to
include transgender hate crimes victims).
37. Although this Article focuses on the United States, others have documented a
similar surge in transgender activism internationally. See STEPHEN WHITTLE, THE
TRANSGENDER DEBATE: THE CRISIS SURROUNDING GENDER IDENTITIES 55 (2000) ("The
past ten years have seen a huge rise in trans action throughout the world.").
38. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 139, § 139.20 (2000).
39. CHAMPAIGN ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 17, art. I, § 17-3 (2000), at
http://www.municode.com; HARRISBURG, PA., CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-101.6 (1992); LOS
ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 49.21 (1992); Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 119628 (Aug.
11, 1999) amending SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 14.04.030 (1986); ST. PAUL, MINN., CODE OF
ORDINANCES ch. 183, § 183.02 (2000), at http://www.ci.stpaul.mn.us/code; URBANA, ILL.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES art. I1, div. I, § 12-39 (2000), at http://www.municode.com.
40. Municipalities that have enacted some type of transgender-inclusive non-
discrimination law are: Ann Arbor, Michigan; Atlanta, Georgia; Benton County, Oregon;
Boulder, Colorado; Cambridge, Massachusets; Champaign, Illinois; DeKalb, Illinois;
Evanston, Illinois; Grand Rapids, Michigan; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Iowa City, Iowa;
Jefferson County, Kentucky; Lexington-Fayette, Kentucky; Los Angeles, California;
Louisville, Kentucky; Madison, Wisconsin; Minneapolis, Minnesota; New Orleans,
Louisiana; Olympia, Washington; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Portland, Oregon; San
Francisco, California; City of Santa Cruz, California; County of Santa Cruz, California;
Seattle, Washington; St. Paul, Minnesota; Toledo, Ohio; Tucson, Arizona; Urbana,
Illinois; West Hollywood, California; York, Pennsylvania; Ypsilanti, Michigan. See app.,
infra, (providing excerpts of the statutory language used to protect transgender people in
these ordinances). The Los Angeles ordinance was held to be preempted by state law in
Delaney v. Superior Fast Freight, 14 Cal. App. 4th 590, 596-98 (2nd Dist. 1993), review
denied, Delaney v. Superior Fast Freight, S032564, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 3063 (Cal. June 3,
1993).
41. PORTLAND, OR., CIVIL RIGHTS ch. 23.01 (2000); Atlanta, Ga., Ordinance No.
0001983 (Dec. 4, 2000) at http://www.ci.atlanta.ga.us/dept/council/
2000/IMAGES/Proposed/OO01983.pdf. In addition to the thirty-one municipalities with
transgender-inclusive non-discrimination laws, two Georgia municipalities, Pine Lake
and Decatur, have policies prohibiting discrimination against transgender people in
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Encouragingly for transgender advocates, progress in this
arena has not been limited to large metropolitan centers, college
towns or any single geographic area.'2 Jurisdictions that have
passed local anti-discrimination laws include cities as culturally
diverse as Ann Arbor, Michigan, Louisville, Kentucky and
Tucson, Arizona.43 They also include a healthy mix of small and
mid-sized cities, such as York, Pennsylvania and Toledo, Ohio
(with populations of approximately 19,000 and 333,000,
respectively), alongside larger cities such as San Francisco,
Pittsburgh and Atlanta."
In 1993, Minnesota became the first jurisdiction to enact a
statewide anti-discrimination law that includes express
protections for transgender people in education, employment,
housing and public accommodations. 45 Although no other state
has yet extended comparable legislative protections to
transgender people, several have taken significant steps in that
direction.46  In 1998, California became the second state,
following Minnesota in 1996,47 to include transgender people in
its state hate crimes statute.48  In 1999, the California
Legislature incorporated the same language into the California
Student Safety and Violence Prevention Act, thereby prohibiting
discrimination against transgender students and teachers, and
administrators. 49 Missouri and Vermont included transgender
public employment. See City of Decatur Resolution, Ga., R-00-XX, May 15, 2000; City of
Pine Lake Personnel Manual Revised & Adopted, Oct. 1999. Ithaca, New York also
includes gender identity as a protected category in its municipal hate crimes statute. See
ITHACA, N.Y., LOCAL LAW No. 2-2000 ch. 215, art V, § 215-30 (2000).
42. CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 2, at 15.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 16.
45. These protections were passed as part of a bill that prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation, which was expressly defined to include transgender people.
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01 (West Supp. 2001); see also CURRAH & MINTER, supra
note 2, at 15 (describing the history behind Minnesota's passage of the first statewide law
protecting transgender people).
46. In 2000, bills that would create comprehensive protections for transgender people
were introduced in California, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri and Vermont,
among others. CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 2, at 15.
47. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.29 (West Supp. 2001) (incorporating the transgender
inclusive definition of sexual orientation in section 363.01).
48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.76 (West 1999).
49. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 220 (West Supp. 2001) (incorporating the language of section
422.76 of the California Penal Code).
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people in their state hate crimes statutes,50 and the governor of
Iowa became the first governor to issue an executive order
prohibiting discrimination against state employees on the basis
of gender identity.5' In 2000, California became the first state to
pass legislation removing "transsexualism" and "gender identity
disorder" from the list of excluded impairments under state
disability laws. 52
All told, about 3.8% of the U.S. population now lives in
jurisdictions with some form of transgender-protective non-
discrimination law.5 3 As modest as these initial legislative gains
may seem, their true significance lies in what they portend for
the future. In the words of a recent news story, "the transgender
community ... appears to be gaining acceptance as a bona fide
minority group."54 For the first time, transgender people are
forging a shared political identity and coalescing into a visible
and increasingly significant political movement.55
III. FOUR KEY ISSUES IN DRAFTING TRANSGENDER-PROTECTIVE
LEGISLATION
After decades of losing in the courts, as described in section I
above, transgender people have begun to organize as a political
constituency and to lobby for the passage of non-discrimination
laws. One of the greatest challenges in that effort has been
drafting statutory language for which there is little or no
50. MO. ANN. STAT. § 557.035.4 (West Supp. 2001) (including gender identity in its
definition of "sexual orientation"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1458 (Supp. 2000) (including
"gender identity" as a protected category).
51. Exec. Order No. 7, Sept. 14, 1999, at http://www.state.ia.us/governor/legaYl
exec_order._sevenjfmal.pdf. Unfortunately, a district court judge subsequently held that
Governor Tom Vilsack lacked authority to issue the order, in a lawsuit filed by republican
state legislators. See Kristi Chew, Judge Declares Vilsack Executive Order Invalid, THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS & LOCAL WIRE, Dec. 7, 2000, WL ALLNEWSPLUS.
52. Assemb. B. 2222, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000); see also Press Release by Jamison Green
& Shannon Minter, Transpeople Removed from California Disability Law Provisions (Oct.
11, 2000) at http://www.transgenderlaw.org.
53. CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 2, at 16. This figure does not include Los Angeles,
where the local ordinance was held to be preempted by state law. See discussion and
sources cited supra note 51.
54. Steve Johnson, Transgender Rights, Cm1. TRIB., Sept. 29, 1998, at C7; see also
John Cloud, Trans Across America: Watch out, Pat Buchanan, Ridiculed for Years,
"Transgenders" Are Emerging as the Newest Group to Demand Equality, TIME, July 20,
1998, at 48 (describing the emergence of transgender people as a new political group);
Deb Price, Transgendered Have Lessons for Society, DETROIT NEWS, June 26, 2000, at 9
(same).
55. WHITTLE, supra note 37, at 56 ("This is a new community with a new sense of self-
respect; it will not go quietly and it may well be that it changes the world for the better,
for us all.").
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precedent, given the virtual absence of prior transgender-specific
legislation anywhere in the world. Although there are now
numerous examples of such laws on the books, 56 courts have not
yet had time to provide much guidance as to problems or
limitations that may be associated with particular kinds of
statutory language. 5v Nonetheless, it is possible to identify four
strategic issues that have repeatedly arisen in drafting this type
of legislation.
A. How to Categorize the Prohibited Discrimination
The first is the question of whether to secure protection for
transgender people by establishing "gender identity"58 (or a
comparable term)59 as a new protected category or, alternatively,
by amending the statutory definition of sexual orientation,
gender or sex to clarify that transgender people should 'be
included within one of those existing categories. In San
Francisco, for example, local legislators amended the local
human rights law to add gender identity as a new protected
category, alongside the existing categories of sex, sexual
orientation, race, disability and religion.6° This approach was
also adopted in sixteen other local non-discrimination laws, as
well as in the statewide hate crimes statute in Vermont and the
local hate crimes statute in Ithaca, New York. 61
56. See, e.g., CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 2, at 17 fig.1 (detailing legislation
protecting transgender people).
57. To date the only decision construing a transgender specific statute is Goins v.
West Group, 619 N.W.2d 424, 428-31 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a transsexual
employee who was denied use of a workplace facility stated a prima facie case of sexual
orientation discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. § 363.03,
subd. 1(2)(c), which defines sexual orientation to include "having or being perceived as
having a self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one's biological maleness
or femaleness").
58. According to Suzanne J. Kessler and Wendy McKenna, gender identity "refers to
an individual's own feeling of whether she or he is a woman or a man, or a girl or a boy.
In essence gender identity is self-attribution of gender." SUZANNE J. KESSLER & WENDY
MCKENNA, GENDER: AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 8 (1978).
59. The legislation in Boulder, Colorado, passed by the City Council on January 20,
2000, uses the term "gender variance" rather than gender identity. BOULDER, COLO.,
CODE 12-1 § 4 (2000). See also Memorandum from Joseph N. de Raismes, III, Boulder
City Attorney, to William R. Toor, Mayor, Members of the City Council, and Ronald A.
Secrist, City Manager (Dec. 20, 1999), at http://www.ci.boulder.co.us/clerk/previousl
list/000201 10.htm (explaining why the term "gender variance" was used in the Boulder
ordinance).
60. S.F., Cal., Ordinance 433-94 (Dec. 30, 1994).
61. Ann Arbor, Mich., Ordinance 10-99 (Mar. 17 1999); Atlanta, Ga., Ordinance No.
0001983 (Dec. 4, 2000), at http://www.ci.atlanta.ga.us/dept/council/2000/IMAGES/
Proposed0001983.pdf.; Benton County, Or., Ordinance 98-0139 (Aug. 14, 1998); Boulder,
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. In contrast, the Minnesota statute incorporates transgender
people within the definition of sexual orientation, which is
defined, in relevant part, as "having or being perceived as having
a self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one's
biological maleness or femaleness."6 2 Transgender people are
also included within the definition of sexual orientation in the
Missouri hate crimes statute63 and in a number of local
ordinances, including those in Evanston, Illinois, Los Angeles,
California, Minneapolis, Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota, Toledo,
Ohio, York, Pennsylvania and Ypsilanti, Michigan.64
In California, the legislature included transgender people in
the California Hate Crimes Law by defining the term "gender" in
the statute as follows: gender "means the victim's actual sex or
the defendant's perception of the victim's sex, and includes the
defendant's perception of the victim's identity, appearance or
behavior, whether or not that identity, appearance or behavior is
different from that traditionally associated with the victim's sex
at birth."65 The strategy of including transgender people under
the rubric of sex or gender has also been used in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, Champaign, Illinois, DeKalb, Illinois,
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Santa
Cruz, California and Urbana, Illinois.66
Co., Ordinance 7040 (Jan. 20 2000); ITHACA, N.Y., LOCAL LAW NO. 2-2000, ch. 215, art. V,
§ 215-30 (2000); Iowa City, Iowa, Ordinance 95-3697 (Oct. 24, 1995); Jefferson County,
Ky., Ordinance 36 (Oct. 12, 1999); Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, Ky.,
Ordinance 201-99 (July 8, 1999); Louisville, KY., Ordinance 9 (Jan. 26, 1999); Madison,
Wis. Equal Opportunities Ordinance (Aug. 1, 2000); New Orleans, La., Ordinance 18794
(July 8, 1998); Olympia, Wash., Ordinance 5670 (Feb. 25, 1997); PORTLAND, OR., CIVIL
RIGHTS ch. 23.01 (2000); S.F., Cal., Ordinance 433-94 (Dec. 30, 1994); Seattle, Wash.,
Ordinance 119628 (Aug. 11, 1999) amending SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 14.04.030 (1986);
Tucson, Ariz., Ordinance 9199 (Feb. 1, 1999); West Hollywood, Cal., Ordinance 98-520
(July 20, 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13, § 1458 (Supp. 2000).
62. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01 (West Supp. 2001).
63. MO. ANN. STAT. § 557.035 (West Supp. 2001).
64. Evanston, Ill., Ordinance 61-0-97 (1997); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF
ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 139, § 139.20 (2000); ST. PAUL, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch.
188, § 183.02 (2000); Toledo, Ohio, Ordinance 1183-98 (Dec. 8, 1998); York, Pa., Ordinance
3-1993 (Feb. 16, 1993); Ypsilanti, Mich., Ordinance 865 (Dec. 16, 1997).
65. CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.76 (West 1999).
66. Cambridge, Mass., Ordinance 1182 (Feb. 24, 1997); CHAMPAIGN, ILL., MUNICIPAL
CODE ch. 17, art. I, § 17-3 (2000) at http://www.municode.com; HARRISBURG, PA. CODE tit.
4, ch. 4-101.6 (1992); CITY OF SANTA CRUZ, CAL., CODE ch. 9.83, § 9.83.020 (1992); County
of Santa Cruz, Cal. Ordinance 4501 (Apr. 28, 1998); PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE ch. 651, §
651.04 (1997); DEKLAB, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 49, § 49.02 (2000); URBANA, ILL., CODE
OF ORDINANCES ch. 12, art III, div. 1 § 12-39 (2000), at http://www.municode.com.
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In sum, legislative protection for transgender people has
been secured in one of three ways: (1) by adding gender identity
and expression (or a comparable terms) as a new protected
status, (2) by creating an inclusive statutory definition of gender
or sex or (3) by creating an inclusive statutory definition of
sexual orientation.
The considerations that go into choosing one of these
strategies over another may vary from place to place, and
different concerns may come into play at the statewide as
opposed to the local level. In general, however, the
considerations militating in favor of adding gender identity as a
separate category center on the benefits of increased visibility
and the symbolic value of having gender identity given equal
billing, so to speak, with other protected classifications.
Designating gender identity as a freestanding classification
sends a powerful message that transgender people are entitled to
full equality and legitimacy.67
There are also potential downsides to establishing gender
identity as a new protected category. Pragmatically, it may be
easier to persuade legislators to amend the definition of an
existing protection than to add a new category of protected
persons to the law, which is likely to be seen as a more radical
step .6 In addition, identifying gender identity as a distinct
classification may reinforce the perception, which is already so
pervasive and damaging in the case law, that transgender people
are somehow fundamentally distinct from-and by implication,
inferior to-non-transgender people, i.e., that transgender people
are not men or women, but something other or in-between. 69
A related concern is that establishing gender identity as a
new legislative category may be misinterpreted as conceding
that transgender people are not entitled to protection under
67. In Iowa City, for example, one transgender activist argued for the importance of
including gender identity as a freestanding category by noting, [M]ost people in this
community will never read the complete ordinance .... What they will see ... is the list
that you give .... If gender identity is subsumed under sexual orientation most of them
will never know that." Public Hearing on an Ordinance Amending the Iowa City Code
title 2, Human Rights Ordinance,. Chapter 2, Section 2-2-2 & 2-1-1 (Sept. 26, 1995)
(testimony of Dawn Atkins).
68. ITS TIME ILL., 4TH ANNUAL REPORT ON DISCRIMINATION AND HATE CRIMES
AGAINST TRANSGENDERED PEOPLE IN ILLINOIS (May 1999), at httpi/www.itstimeil.
org/reports /reportl999.html#a3.
69. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text (describing the dehumanizing effect
of courts' refusal to recognize transsexual people as men or women in sex discrimination
cases).
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existing sex discrimination laws. 70 To avoid this possibility, some
advocates and legislators have opted to amend the statutory
definition of "sex" or "gender" in existing statutes to clarify that
transgender people should already be covered under those laws.
In New York City, for example, transgender activists introduced
a bill amending the New York City Human Rights Law to add a
transgender-inclusive definition of the term "gender," which is
already included in the local law. The bill's legislative findings
states that this amendment is designed to clarify existing law. 71
Regardless of which legislative approach is taken, however,
there is no logical or principled reason why efforts to obtain
explicit statutory protection for transgender people (whether
successful or not) should be deemed to preclude efforts to secure
protection for transgender people under sex discrimination
and/or other existing statutes as well. Like many other types of
discrimination, anti-transgender discrimination may fall under
more than one category of discrimination and thus may be
cognizable under more than one statutory provision.72 There is
no reason to hold anti-transgender discrimination to a different
standard in this regard.
B. How Broadly to Define Who Is Protected
A second strategic issue concerns how broadly or narrowly to
define the protected status or group. Regardless of whether
transgender people are included in a new category or under the
70. See Franke, supra note 5, at 381 (expressing concern that establishing
tranagender people as a separate protected category in legislation may undermine efforts
to secure protection for transgender people under existing sex discrimination laws).
71. New York City B., Int. No. 754 (2000). The section reads, in part:
Included in the City's Human Rights Law is a prohibition of
discrimination against individuals based on gender. The scope of this
gender-based protection, however, requires clarification. This local law is
intended to make clear that all gender-based discrimination-including,
but not limited to, discrimination based on an individual's actual or
perceived sex, and discrimination based on an individual's gender
identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression-constitutes a
violation of the City's Human Rights Law.
Id. § 1.
72. See, e.g., Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 454-60 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
school disctrict's failure to protect a gay male student from harassment constituted
impermissible discrimination on the basis of sex and of sexual orientation); Lam v. Univ.
of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the plaintiff, an Asian woman,
could properly allege both race and sex discrimination and noting that "the attempt to
bisect a person's identity at the intersection of race and gender often distorts or ignores
the particular nature of their experiences); Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435,
441-44 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a university's denial of insurance benefits to
same-sex domestic partners discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation and of sex).
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rubric of sexual orientation or sex, advocates and legislators have
faced the challenge ,of finding language that is specific enough to
remove any doubt that transgender people are protected, and yet
broad enough to encompass the full range of those who need
protection. In Olympia, Washington, for example, the statute
defines the protected category very specifically, as "the status of
being transsexual, transvestite, or transgender."v3 This type of
very specific enumeration can be useful insofar as it leaves less
room for ambiguity about the purpose of the law and may serve
to eliminate or at least restrain the kind of semantic
manipulations that have led courts to exclude transgender people
from Title VII and state sex discrimination laws. The downside
of this approach, however, is that such a narrowly drafted law
may be construed to exclude gender variant people who may not
identify or even necessarily be perceived as a specific "type" of
transgender person. In Minnesota, the legislature sought to
avoid this problem by defining the scope of protection in broad
conceptual terms, as extending to all persons "having or being
perceived as having a self-image or identity that is not
traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or
femaleness."v4
Thus far, most localities have incorporated some variation of
the broad, Minnesota-type language and have avoided relying
exclusively on a list of specifically protected groups. In Tucson,
for example, the ordinance combines general and specific
language by defining gender identity to mean "an individual's
various attributes as they are understood to be masculine and/or
feminine and shall be broadly interpreted to include pre- and
post-operative transsexuals, as well as other persons who are, or
are perceived to be, transgender."75 This hybrid approach has the
merit of ensuring protection for specific groups (such as
transsexuals) while simultaneously avoiding any implication that
other, non-enumerated groups or individuals should not be
protected as well.
Similar considerations were behind Seattle's decision to
revise its ordinance in 1999. The original ordinance, which was
first passed in 1986, limited protection to discrimination on the
73. Olympia, Wash., Ordinance 5670 (Feb. 25, 1997). The same strategy was used in
Benton County, Oregon, which added protections for gender identity in 1998 and defined
the term to mean the "status of being transsexual." Benton County, Or., Ordinance 98-
0139 (Aug. 14, 1998).
74. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01 (West Supp. 2001); see also CURRAH & MINTER, supra
note 2, at 39 (describing the intentions of those who drafted the Minnesota statute).
75. Tucson, Ariz., Ordinance 9199 (Feb. 1, 1999).
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basis of "transsexuality, or transvestism."16 After extensive
review, the City of Seattle Commission on Sexual Minorities
concluded that the "terminology used by the City of Seattle on
this matter could be changed to be ... more accurate, inclusive
and more easily administered in its attempts to protect gender
non-conforming persons."vv The Commission noted that "the
words transsexuality [and] transvestism, but not the word
transgendered, appear in [the 1986 statute]."78 The Commission
concluded, however, that simply expanding the list to include
new terms was not an adequate solution, because "doing so could
allow the term transgendered to be read in its narrowest
definition, and thus leave unprotected some other members of
the gender identity community ....- 9 Instead the Commission
recommended revising the law to include general language
similar to that used in Minnesota, as well as a non-exhaustive
listing of covered groups.80 Commission member Marsha Botzer
explained the reasoning behind the recommendation: "Every few
years, there's a new word. When we did the law the first time in
the '80's, 'transgender' wasn't something anyone used. With all
these words of the week, the real object is to find the most
inclusive set of words."81
Some advocates and legislators have also been concerned
that using clinical terms such as "transsexual" or "transvestite"
may lead to an overly narrow interpretation of who is covered by
the law. In particular, because transsexual people must usually
receive a diagnosis of gender identity disorder8 2 to obtain medical
treatment, using only the term transsexual may arbitrarily
exclude transgender persons who are unable or choose not to
obtain medical care. In 1999, the city council in Boulder,
Colorado considered limiting the class of persons protected in a
76. SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 14.04.030 (1986), amended by Seattle, Wash., Ordinance
119628 (Aug. 11, 1999).
77. POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING TRANSGENDERED
CITIZENS IN SEATTLE, SEATTLE COMMN FOR SEXUAL MINORITIES 4 (May 1999), at
http://www.ci.seattle. wa.us/scsm/transgender.html.
78. Id. at 7.
79. Id.
80. The new law defines gender identity to mean "having an identity, expression, or
physical characteristics not traditionally associated with one's biological sex or one's sex
at birth, including a person's attitudes, preferences, beliefs and practices pertaining
thereto." Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 119628 (Aug. 11, 1999), amending SEATTLE, WASH.,
CODE § 14.04030 (1986).
81. Interview with Marsha Botzer, Commissioner, The Seattle Commission for Sexual
Minorities (July 19, 1999).
82. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 532-38 (4th ed. 1994) (defining gender identity disorder).
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proposed non-discrimination law to those who were undergoing
or had completed sex-reassignment, as certified by a licensed
physician.8 3 Christa Kriesel, the coordinator for a Boulder
County Health Department program for gay, lesbian, bisexual
and transgender youth, argued that the licensed physician
requirement would be "'tragic because... everyone does not have
equal access to medical care."84 Boulder Human Relations
Commissioner Liz Padilla agreed stating, "I don't want to be
responsible for somebody's pain just because they don't have the
money for a doctor or they just haven't gone that route."8
Transgender activist Kathy Wilson also argued against this
limitation: "The idea of singling out people and making them
carry a bit of documentation to have access to the most basic
human rights-that is most offensive to me."86 After a robust
public debate on this issue, the Boulder City Council decided to
omit this restriction.8 7
C. How to Define the Scope of Protection
A related issue concerns the tension between language that
appears to define transgender identity solely as a status (such as
"gender identity") and language that also includes appearances,
conduct and behavior (such as "gender expression"). Trans-
gender activists generally agree that some status-based language
is necessary to make the point that gender identity is a
fundamental aspect of personhood and that transgender people
are indeed a real and legitimate minority group, deserving of civil
rights protections. At the same time, relying exclusively on
status-based language runs the risk that some courts may
misinterpret the language to exclude conduct, such as undergoing
sex reassignment or changing one's gender presentation, from
protection.88 To alleviate that risk, the majority of the
83. Halle Shilling, Gender Identity Discussed, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, Aug. 17, 1999,
at IC.
84. Mike Mills, City of Boulder Ponders Transgendered Rights, BOULDER PRIDE NEWS,
Aug. 12 1999, at http://www.boulderpride.org/NewsArchive/1999/MikeMillsTransgender
Rights.html.
85. Kristin Dizon, City Council Faces Human Rights Vote, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA,
July 20, 1999, at 1C.
86. Shilling, supra note 83.
87. Id.
88. See CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 2, at 38-41; see, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Seligman &
Latz, Inc., 636 F.2d 1047, 1049 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that an employer who fired a
transsexual woman for transitioning on the job did not discriminate against the plaintiff
for being transsexual, but rather for dressing as a female); Grossman v. Bernards
Township Bd. of Educ., No. 74-1904, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16261, at *9 (D.N.J. Sept. 10,
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ordinances that have been passed in the U.S. combine elements
of both status and conduct.8 9 This has been accomplished either
by using the term "gender identity and expression," or by
otherwise defining the prohibited basis of discrimination to
include discrimination on the basis of external as well as internal
manifestations of identity.' °
D. How to Avoid Dress Code Exemptions
A final strategic issue concerns how to prevent legislators
from undermining the integrity of transgender-protective laws by
including so-called "cross-dressing exclusions." These exclusions
permit employers to engage in sex-based discrimination in
matters relating to dress and appearance. In the handful of
jurisdictions in which they have been adopted, it is clear that
they are based on irrational and sensational fears about "men in
dresses" rather than on any principled, realistic or legitimate
concerns. 91  Although primarily intended to deny legal
protections to men who wear clothing that is considered "too
feminine," these exclusions harm women by perpetuating gender
stereotypes and reinforcing the devaluation of qualities and
characteristics associated with femininity.92  Cross-dressing
exclusions are also increasingly at odds with the growing body of
cases finding that discrimination against masculine-appearing
women and feminine-appearing men violates Title VII and
similar state laws. 93
1975) (holding that transsexual woman "was discharged by the defendant school board
not because of her status as a female, but rather because of her change in sex from the
male to female gender").
89. CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 2, at 17-18; see supra notes 58-72 and
accompanying text.
90. CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 2, at 38-41.
91. Id. at 54-57.
92. See Case, supra note 10, at 1-3, 61-75 (explaining that discrimination against men
who wear feminine clothing harms women by reinforcing the devaluation of femininity).
93. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (holding that an
accounting firm engaged in prohibited sex discrimination when it denied a partnership to
a female employee who was told that she was too 'macho" and needed to "walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry"); see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d
252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that "a man can ground a claim on evidence that other
men discriminated against him because he did not meet stereotyped expectations of
maculinity"); Samborski v. W. Valley Nuclear Servs. Co., 99-CV-02143E(M), 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20263, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1999) (reinstating sex discrimination claim
on behalf of female employee who alleged that she was discriminated against because she
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Unfortunately, activists in a few jurisdictions have been
unable to fend off these kinds of restrictions. In New Orleans,
some local legislators were so concerned that the local law might
protect a "man in a dress" that they insisted on adding broad
exclusionary language.9 4 The New Orleans exemption states that
"nothing in this Chapter shall prohibit an employer from
prohibiting cross-dressing in the work place or while an employee
is acting in the course and scope of his or her employment." 95
The only exception is an additional provision requiring employers
to accommodate transsexual employees undergoing sex
reassignment surgery.9 This provision effectively limits
employment protection to those under a doctor's care because it
requires the employee to provide a written statement certifying
that he/she "presents the characteristics of gender identification
disorder."97
In Kentucky, local transgender advocates spoke out strongly
against the unfairness of limiting protection to transsexual
persons. F.M. Chester, a transgender lesbian, testified about the
harmful impact of gender based dress codes on non-transsexual
people at a city council hearing in Lexington:
Many of the people in this room probably thought I was male
when they first saw me. I am not. I am biologically female.
However, my gender presentation is very masculine. I am a
"mannish" woman. I also wear men's clothes. I cannot wear
women's clothes comfortably. They feel wrong. When I wear
women's clothes I feel anguish. I feel like I am in "drag" and
that I am "passing" as a woman. I have always been like this.
... I am not transexual [sic]. At this point in my life, I do not
want to become a man. I have considered changing my sex
and have rejected it for me right now. 98
did not exhibit her femininity in a stereotypical fashion); EEOC v. Trugreen Ltd.
Partnership, 122 F. Supp. 986, 993 (W.D. Wis. 1999) ( holding that a plaintiff could show
prohibited sex discrimination under Title VII by showing that he was treated adversely
because he did not conform to stereotypical masculine roles).
94. Shilling, supra note 83.
95. New Orleans, La., Ordinance 18794 (July 1, 1998).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. F.M. Chester, Address at the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Council Meeting
(July 1, 1999), in CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 2, at 30-31 (supporting a fairness
ordinance with transgender-inclusive language; the ordinance passed a week later).
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Despite opposition from Chester and others, Louisville and
Lexington both enacted ordinances that contain cross-dressing
exclusions. 99 To date, however, these troubling exclusions are the
exception rather than the rule; most jurisdictions that have
enacted transgender-protective legislation have rejected this type
of exclusion as unnecessary, unprincipled and inconsistent with
emerging sex discrimination law.
E. Summary
Despite the fears of some, the emergence of a transgender
rights movement has not resulted in laws that protect only a
narrowly defined class, such as transsexuals or even self-
identified transgender people, or that rely upon an overly narrow
or sociological account of transgender identity. 1°0 Instead,
transgender advocates and legislators have attempted to fashion
statutory language that respects both the diversity among
transgender people and the commonality between transgender
people and others. Thus, with few exceptions, these statutes do
not simply add the term "transgender" to a laundry list of
protected classes. Rather, the language employed is principled,
broad and inclusive of as wide an array of people as possible,
recognizing, for example: that female-to-male transsexuals often
have different routes to transition than male-to-female
transsexuals, and that many female-to-male transsexuals may
never have genital ("bottom") surgery; that many transsexuals
are non-operative, either because they cannot afford or choose
not to undergo sexual reassignment or are prohibited from doing
so for health reasons; that some transgender people may choose
to take hormones but not transition from their birth sex, or may
choose to take low doses of hormones to bring about some
physical changes; that some transsexual people who are
99. Louisville, Ky., Ordinance 9 (Jan. 26, 1999); Lexington, KY., Ordinance 201-99
(July 8, 1999). These ordinances define gender identity, in part, as "manifesting, for
reasons other than dress, an identity not traditionally associated with one's biological
maleness or femaleness." Id. (emphasis added). They also contain an express dress code
provision which provides: "nothing [herein) shall be construed to prevent an employer
from . . . enforcing an employee dress policy which policy may include restricting
employees from dress associated with the other gender." Id. (emphasis added).
100. See, e.g., WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE
MODERNITY 65-66 (1995) (criticizing Santa Cruz ordinance protecting transgender people,
in addition to other groups, as a misguided attempt to install overly specific and
historically contingent identities in the law); Franke, supra note 5, at 381 (expressing
concern about laws that simply add transgender people to the laundry list of protected
categories).
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transitioning or have transitioned may not be under a doctor's
care; that many transgender people are not readily identifiable
as such and do not challenge prevailing gender norms in any
visible way; that other transgender people are more visible,
either because they cannot or do not wish to conceal their
transgender status; that some transgender people do not fit
easily into one of two gender categories. Moreover, the broad
definitions used in most of these statutes also include people who
do not identify as transgender, but whose gender identity or
expression is at odds with stereotypical norms about gender in
some way, such as men who have traits considered to be
"feminine," or women who have traits considered to be
"masculine."
IV. CONCLUSION
After meeting with decades of rejection in the courts, it is
only in the past ten years that transgender people have turned to
the legislative branches of government and made a concerted
effort to lobby for explicit statutory protections. The initial
results of these efforts have been impressive, whether measured
narrowly in terms of legislative victories or more broadly in
terms of greater social acceptance and understanding. It would
be a mistake, however, to conclude that transgender people have
simply abandoned litigation in favor of legislation and public
education. 1 1 To the contrary, as transgender people have begun
to achieve some visibility and success in the legislative arena, the
judicial environment has begun to shift as well.'02 Thus, while
true equality for transgender people is still a distant goal, never
101. For a useful discussion of the relative merits of litigation and legislation as
vehicles for pursuing civil rights, see generally Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart:
Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 697 (1997), and
responses, Nan D. Hunter, Lawyering for Social Justice, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1009 (1997);
Chai R. Feldblum, The Moral Rhetoric of Legislation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 992 (1997).
102. See, e.g., Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1199-1203 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that transgender people should be protected under Title VII and other sex discrimination
statutes); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding
that a transgender plaintiff who was denied an opportunity to apply for a bank loan was
entitled to bring a sex discrimination claim under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act);
Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1099 (9th Cir. 2000) (granting asylum to a
transgender gay man from Mexico); Doe v. Brockton Sch. Comm., 2000-J-638, slip. op. at
2-6 (Mass. App. Nov. 30, 2000), affg Doe v. Yunits, No. 00-1060-A (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct.
11, 2000) (affirming injunctive order requiring a public middle school in Brockton,
Massachusetts to permit male-to-female transsexual student to attend school in female
clothing); Declaratory Ruling, supra note 13 (holding that transgender people are
protected under Connecticut state laws prohibiting sex discrimination).
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before has the political and legal momentum for achieving it been
greater.
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APPENDIX
I. Statutory Definitions of "Gender Identity" or "Gender Variance"
Ann Arbor, Mich., Ordinance 10-99 (Mar. 17, 1999): "'Gender
Identity.' A person's actual or perceived gender, including a
person's gender identity, self-image, appearance, expression, or
behavior, whether or not that gender identity, self-image,
appearance, expression, or behavior is different from that
traditionally associated with the person's sex at birth as being
either female or male."
Atlanta, Ga., Ordinance No. 0001983 (Dec. 4, 2000), at
http://www.ci.atlanta.ga.us/dept/council/2000/IMAGES/Proposed/
0001983.pdf:
Gender identity means self-perception as male or female, and
shall include a person's identity, expression, or physical
characteiistics, whether or not traditionally associated with
one's biological sex or one's sex at birth, including
transsexual, transvestite, and transgendered, and including a
person's attitudes, preferences, beliefs, and practices
pertaining thereto, including but not limited to assumption of
male or female identity by appearance or medical treatment.
Benton County, Or., Ordinance 98-0139 (Aug. 14, 1998): "'Gender
identity' includes the status of being transsexual or transgender."
Boulder, Co., Ordinance 7040 (Jan. 20, 2000): "'Gender variance'
means a persistent sense that a person's gender identity is
incongruent with the person's biological sex, excluding the
element of persistence for persons under age twenty-one and
including, without limitation, transitioned transsexuals."
Although "gender variance" is the overall category, the
statute in Boulder also defines other terms used throughout the
statute: "'Gender identity' means a person's various individual
attributes, actual or perceived, that may be in accord with, or
sometimes opposed to, one's physical anatomy, chromosomal sex,
genitalia, or sex assigned at birth;" "'Genital reassignment
surgery' means surgery to alter a person's genitals, in order to
complete a program of sex reassignment treatment;" "'Sex' means
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biological sex, the sum of a person's physical characteristics;"
"'Sex reassignment treatment' means treatment to change a
person's sex, based on medically recognized treatment protocols
such as that published by the Harry Benjamin International
Gender Dysphoria Association;" "Transitioning transsexual'
means a person experiencing gender variance who is undergoing
sex reassignment treatment;" "'Transitioned transsexual' means
a person who has completed genital reassignment surgery."
Iowa City, Iowa, Ordinance 95-3697 (Oct. 24, 1995): "GENDER
IDENTITY: A person's various individual attributes, actual or
perceived, in behavior, practice or appearance, as they are
understood to be masculine and/or feminine."
ITHACA, N.Y., LOCAL LAW NO. 2-2000 ch. 215, art. V, § 215-30
(2000): "Gender identity or presentation shall include a person's
gender identity, self-image, appearance, expression, or behavior,
whether or not that gender identity, self-image, appearance,
expression, or behavior is different from that traditionally
associated with the person's sex at birth."
Jefferson County, Ky., Ordinance 36 (Oct. 12, 1999): "GENDER
IDENTITY. Manifesting an identity not traditionally associated
with one's biological maleness or femaleness."
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, Ky., Ordinance
201-99 (July 8, 1999): "'[Glender identity' shall mean: (a) having
a gender identity as a result of a sex change surgery; or (b)
manifesting, for reasons other than dress, an identity not
traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or
femaleness."
Louisville, Ky., Ordinance 9 (Jan. 26, 1999): "'GENDER
IDENTITY.' (1) Having a gender identity as a result of a sex
change surgery; or (2) Manifesting, for reasons other than dress,
an identity not traditionally associated with one's biological
maleness or femaleness."
Madison, Wis., Equal Opportunities Ordinance (Aug. 1, 2000):
Gender identity is the actual or perceived condition, status or
acts of 1) identifying emotionally or psychologically with the
sex other than one's biological or legal sex at birth, whether or
not there has been a physical change of the organs of sex; 2)
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presenting and/or holding oneself out to the public as a
member of the biological sex that was not one's biological or
legal sex at birth; 3) lawfully displaying physical
characteristics and/or behavioral characteristics and/or
expressions which are widely perceived as being more
appropriate to the biological or legal sex that was not one's
biological or legal sex at birth, as when a male is perceived as
feminine or a female is perceived as masculine; and/or 4)
being physically and/or behaviorally androgynous.
New Orleans, La., Ordinance 18794 (July 8, 1998):
"Gender identification" is the actual or perceived condition,
status or acts of: 1) identifying emotionally or psychologically
with the sex other than one's biological or legal sex at birth,
whether or not there has been a physical change of the organs
of sex, 2) presenting and/or holding oneself out to the public
as a member of the biological sex that was not one's biological
or legal sex at birth, 3) lawfully displaying physical
characteristics and/or behavioral characteristics and/or
expressions which are widely perceived as being more
appropriate to the biological or legal sex other than one's
biological sex at birth, as when a male is perceived as
feminine or a female is perceived as masculine, and/or 4)
being physically and/or behaviorally androgynous.
Olympia, Wash., Ordinance 5670 (Feb. 25, 1997): "'Gender
Identity' includes the status of being transsexual, transvestite, or
transgender."
PORTLAND, OR., CIVIL RIGHTS ch. 23.01 (2000): "'Gender Identity'
- a person's actual or perceived sex, including a person's identity,
appearance or behavior, whether or not that identity,
appearance, or behavior is different from that traditionally
associated with the person's sex at birth."
S.F., Cal., Ordinance 433-94 (Dec. 30, 1994): "'Gender Identity'
shall mean a person's various individual attributes as they are
understood to be masculine and/or feminine."
Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 119628 (Aug. 11 1999), amending
SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 1404.030 (1986): "'Gender identity'
means a person's identity, expression, or physical characteristics,
whether or not traditionally associated with one's biological sex
or one's sex at birth, including transsexual, transvestite, and
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transgendered, and including a person's attitudes, preferences,
beliefs, and practices pertaining thereto."-
Tucson, Ariz., Ordinance 9199 (Feb. 1, 1999): "Gender identity
means an individual's various attributes as they are understood
to be masculine and/or feminine and shall be broadly interpreted
to include pre- and post-operative transsexuals, as well as other
persons who are, or are perceived to be, transgendered."
West Hollywood, Cal., Ordinance 98-520 (July 20, 1998): "Gender
Identity refers to a person's actual or perceived sex, and includes
a person's identity, appearance, or behavior, whether or not that
identity, appearance, or behavior is different from that
traditionally associated with the person's sex at birth."
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1458 (Supp. 2000) "'Protected category'
includes race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age,
service in the armed forces of the United States, handicap . . .
sexual orientation and gender identity, and perceived
membership in any such group."
II. Statutory Definitions of Sexual Orientation or Affectional
Preference that Include Transgender People
Evanston, Ill., Ordinance 61-0-97 (1997):
Sexual orientation is defined as: Having or perceived as
having emotional, physical, or sexual attachment to another
without regard to the sex of that person or having or being
perceived as having an orientation for such an attachment, or
having or being perceived as having a self image or identity
not traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or
femaleness.
LOS ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 49.71 (1992):
As used in this ordinance, the term "sexual orientation".
shall mean an individual having or manifesting an emotional
or physical attachment to another consenting adult person or
persons, or having manifesting a preference for such
attachment, or having or projecting a self-image not
associated with one's biological maleness, or one's biological
femaleness.
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MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7 ch. 139 § 139-
10 (2000): "Affectional Preference: Having or manifesting an
emotional or physical attachment to another consenting person
or persons, or having or manifesting a preference for such
attachment, or having or projecting a self-image not associated
with one's biological maleness or one's biological femaleness."
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(45) (West Supp. 2001):
'Sexual orientation' means having or being perceived as
having an emotional, physical, or sexual attachment to
another person without regard to the sex of that person or
having or being perceived as having an orientation for such
attachment, or having or being perceived as having a
self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one's
biological maleness or femaleness. 'Sexual orientation' does
not include a physical or sexual attachment to children by an
adult.
ST. PAUL, MINN., CODE ch. 183, § 183.02 (2000), at
www.ci.stpauul.mw.us/code:
Sexual or affectional orientation means having or being
perceived as having an emotional or physical attachment to
another consenting adult person or persons, or having or
being perceived as having an orientation for such attachment,
or having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity
not traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or
one's biological femaleness.
Note also that the St. Paul Code defines sex: "Sex means being
identified as having or being perceived as having male or female
characteristics and encompasses, but is not limited to,
pregnancy, childbirth, disabilities related to pregnancy or
childbirth, and sexual harassment."
Toledo, Ohio, Ordinance 1183-98 (Dec. 8, 1998): "'Sexual
Orientation' means a person's actual or perceived
heterosexuality, bisexuality, homosexuality, or gender identity,
by orientation or practice."
York, Pa., Ordinance 3-1993 (Feb. 16, 1993): "'Sexual
Orientation' means male or female homosexuality,
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heterosexuality and bisexuality, by preference, practice or as
perceived by* others."
Ypsilanti, Mich., Ordinance 865 (Dec. 16, 1997): "'Sexual
Orientation.' Heterosexuality, male or female homosexuality,
bisexuality or gender identity."
III. Statutory Definitions of Gender or Sex that Include
Transgender People
CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.76 (West 1999): "'Gender' means the
victim's actual sex or the defendant's perception of the victim's
sex, and includes the defendant's perception of the victim's
identity, appearance, or behavior, whether or not that identity,
appearance, or behavior is different from that traditionally
associated with the victim's sex at birth."
Cambridge, Mass., Ordinance 1182 (Feb. 24, 1997): "'Gender'
means the actual or perceived appearance, expression or identity
of a person with respect to masculinity and femininity; and 'Same
sex' means occupying the same social and identity roles as
another with respect to being male female [sic]."
CHAMPAIGN, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 17, art. I., § 17-3 (2000),
at http://www.municode.com: "Sex means the state of being or
becoming male or female or transsexual, or pregnant."
CITY OF SANTA CRUZ, CAL., CODE ch. 9.83, § 9.83.010 (1992):
"'Gender' shall have the same meaning as 'sex' as that term is
used herein and shall be broadly interpreted to include persons
who are known or assumed to be transgendered."
County of Santa Cruz, Cal., Ordinance 4501 (Apr. 28, 1998):
"'Gender' has the same meaning as 'sex' as that term is used in
state or federal anti-discrimination legislation and shall be
broadly interpreted to include sexual stereotyping and persons
who are known or assumed to be transgendered."
DEKALB, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 49 § 49.02 (2000): The
definition of "'gender' [was recommended to be] actual or
perceived sex, including a person's gender identity, appearance or
behavior[, whether or not that gender identity, appearance, or
behavior] is different from that traditionally associated with the
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person's sex at birth." Tyler Vincent, Gender Ordinance Passed,
NORTHERN STAR ONLINE, Fall 2000, http://www.star.niu.edu/
20000929/city/gender.asp.
HARRISBURG, PA., CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-101.6 (1992): "'Sex' means
the gender, male or female, of a person, including those persons
who are changing or have changed their sex."
PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE ch. 651 § 651.04 (1997), amended by
Ordinance 1-1997 (1997): "'Sex' means the gender of a person, as
perceived, presumed or assumed by others, including those who
are changing or have changed their gender identification."
URBANA, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 12, art. III, div. 1, § 12-
39 (2000), at http://www.municode.com: "Sex. The state of being
or becoming male or female or transsexual, or pregnant, or the
ability to become pregnant."
